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Abstract
Do private property rights mitigate overexploitation of common pool resources,
and if so, under which circumstances? In this paper, we examine the effects of
private property rights on the status of marine fisheries by combining data on eco-
logical, economic and institutional characteristics into a panel data set, spanning
over 50 years, 170 exclusive economic zones and 800 species. To address the in-
herent endogeneity problem of policy implementation, we employ both a difference-
in-differences (DiD) and instrumental variable (IV) strategy. Results from both
estimations suggest that property rights lower the probability of a fish stock col-
lapsing, but the effect varies with country and species characteristics. Specifically,
we find evidence suggesting that property rights are more effective when ownership
is transferable, the general level of ownership protection is strong, trade openness
is high, the regenerative capacity of the resource is high, and the species value is
high.
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1 Introduction
One of the key properties of social-ecological systems is that social and natural processes
are intrinsically linked and mutually influence each other. While formal institutions are
typically designed to prevent undesirable outcomes, such as economic losses or ecological
collapse, their actual implementation usually depends on how the system has performed
in the past. This potential reverse causality makes it difficult to evaluate causal effects
of implemented policies. Marine fisheries are prime examples of systems where economic,
biological, and governance processes are deeply intertwined (Webster, 2015; Grainger and
Parker, 2013), and evaluating the effectiveness of institutions such as private property
rights is therefore challenging. In addition to establishing causality, understanding under
which conditions property rights are effective, and why, is crucial for successful resource
management. Have current rights-based policies mitigated problems of overuse, and if so,
what characterizes policy success? Such insights are sorely needed in the case of marine
fisheries, where overexploitation and depletion is widespread (Costello et al., 2016).
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between overexploitation of marine re-
sources and private property rights (PPRs) by exploiting a global panel dataset on eco-
logical, economic and institutional variables, spanning over 5 decades. The first goal of
the paper is to recover a causal estimate of policy implementation on ecological outcome
variables to see if property rights can help to mitigate the tragedy of the commons in
ocean fisheries. The second goal of the paper is to investigate under which conditions
PPRs are likely to be successful. Are there key characteristics of countries or the re-
source itself that are likely to strengthen the effect of PPRs, and are there specific policy
design elements that are associated with better performance? Such insights may shed
light on the potential effectiveness of PPRs if implemented in settings where resource and
country characteristics differ. As the far majority of stocks around the world are still
subject to open-access, learning from past experience can provide important insights for
policy-makers on the effectiveness of private property regimes.
The seminal paper on the effect of PPRs on the state of marine ecosystems is Costello
et al. (2008), showing that fisheries that have adopted individual transferable quotas
(ITQs) are less prone to collapse. While their study took the literature a step forward
by combining a global dataset with a difference-in-differences (DID) strategy, it also has
several limitations. First, their estimation strategy does not account for potential reverse
causality and time-varying omitted variable biases, calling into question their ability to
make causal claims. Second, they are not able to distinguish the effect of tradable quotas
from non-tradable quotas, or from having a total allowable catch (TAC) - although a
follow-up study (Costello et al., 2010) provides suggestive evidence that quota systems
do have an effect beyond the assigned TAC.1 Third, while they find a favorable effect
1A TAC limits the total allowable catch, and is an essential part of a quota system.
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on average, their estimate might conceal considerable heterogeneity across countries and
species. This makes it hard to draw policy recommendations on potential expansions to
other geographical, institutional and ecological settings. Fourth, they infer the state of
the stock through catches, rather than biomass, which limits understanding of ecological
outcomes, such as a stock collapse.
While later studies have tried to address some of these issues (see e.g., Costello et al.,
2010; Essington, 2010; Melnychuk et al., 2012), the inherent endogeneity problem of policy
implementation is not addressed. As a consequence, the findings might merely reflect
correlations and/or potential feedback effects from the environment to the regulatory
regime. Without establishing causality, we cannot be sure that implementing a PPR
regime will have any effect on collapse.
In this study, we address several shortcomings of the previous literature. First, our
study is one of few global empirical analyses on property rights and ecological outcomes,
covering over 170 exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and 800 species over a 50 year period.
Second, we address potential problems of reverse causality and omitted variable bias by
combining a DiD estimator with several time-varying control variables. Furthermore,
by estimating a DiD with leads and lags we can examine how treatment effects unfold
over time, as well as explicitly test if pre-treatment trends are similar for the treatment
and control group. To further strengthen the credibility of our results, we employ a novel
instrumental variable strategy. The instrument we propose is the implementation of quota
systems in other environmental domains, like forest, land, water, hunting, and pollution.
We hypothesize that implementation of quota systems in other domains partly reflect an
underlying preference for market-based solutions to deal with common pool resources, and
in particular a preference towards assigning property rights. By exploiting variation in an
instrumental variable, as well as including several time-varying control variables, we hope
to mitigate potential problems of reverse causality and unobserved characteristics driving
the results. While other studies in environmental economics have successfully employed
an IV strategy to estimate a causal relationship between PPRs and resource use (see e.g.,
Liscow, 2013; Aichele and Felbermayr, 2012), we are, as far as we are aware of, the first
global study to employ an IV strategy to estimate a causal effect of private property rights
on overexploitation of marine resources.
Third, in contrast to Costello et al. (2008), we examine the effects of a broader group
of quota systems and not only ITQs. This allows us to test for potential differential
effects across quota systems with different properties, such as the transferability of quotas.
Furthermore, as our instrumental variable is meant to capture a preference for market-
based solutions, it helps to identify effects of quota systems that go beyond assigning
a TAC. Fourth, while we use exploitation status inferred from catch data in the main
analysis, we do a separate analysis where we infer exploitation status from biomass for (i)
a small subsample where biomass data is available, and (ii) simulated biomass data for
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the entire sample from catch data following the method developed by Martell and Froese
(2013).
Lastly, and importantly, we examine how effects of PPRs interact with different coun-
try and species characteristics, such as the strength of ownership protection, trade open-
ness, species value, and the regenerative capacity of the resource. In countries with
uncertain ownership rights, a tradable quota system might de facto resemble an open
access regime (Grafton, 2000; Fischer and Laxminarayan, 2010; Grainger and Costello,
2014; Copeland and Taylor, 2009; Costello and Grainger, 2018). While a firm may decide
to overexploit a resource if property rights are not secure (Long, 1975), insecure property
rights may also discourage a firm from making the necessary investments in the first place,
potentially leading to underexploitation (Laurent-Lucchetti and Santugini, 2012). Em-
pirically, the ambiguous nature of property rights on exploitation have been established
by Bohn and Deacon (2000). Further, while Chichilnisky (1994) argues that trade fuels
overexploitation in countries with weak property rights, Brander and Taylor (1997) show
that trade openness can also work in the opposite direction. Copeland and Taylor (2009)
consider in a theoretical model the case where property rights are endogenous. Upon
opening for trade, a country may make a transition from (de facto) open access to PPRs,
depending on various factors, such as the enforcement power of a government and the
intrinsic growth rate of a species. Understanding how various country and species char-
acteristics influence the success of PPRs also enables a discussion of where PPRs would
likely be effective if implemented.
Results from the DiD specification with leads and lags show that the pre-treatment
development in ecological outcomes is not parallel for PPR and non-PPR fisheries. Failing
to account for violation of the common trend assumption will lead to biased estimates.
By including several time-varying covariates in the regression, we mitigate the problem of
different pre-treatment trends. Furthermore, by coupling the DiD with an instrumental
variable strategy, we hope to further strengthen the credibility of our results. Using both
a DiD with time varying covariates and an IV-DiD specification, we find that property
rights have a positive effect on ecological outcomes by preventing collapse of the fish
stock. On average, PPRs lower the probability of a collapse by around 7-8% when using
the DiD estimate.2 Assuming a linear treatment effect over time, this translates into an
annual effect of around 0.6%, which is slightly larger than what has been found in previous
studies. By allowing the treatment effect to vary in a non-linear way over time, we find
that effects of the quota systems do not materialize until a decade after implementation,
suggesting that it takes time for stocks to rebuild. After 15 years, a PPR-fishery is about
7% less likely of being collapsed compared to a non-PPR fishery. After 20 and 26 years
2The estimated favorable effect is robust to a battery of robustness checks, including adding various
covariates, restricting the sample to treated species or treated EEZs only, and assigning collapse status
based on simulated biomass data. We also run placebo tests where we randomly assign treatment status
to non-PPR fisheries within treated EEZs, and find no favorable effect.
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the estimated probabilities increase to 11% and 21% respectively. While we find a similar
pattern when inferring exploitation status from biomass data in a small subsample, large
standard errors give statistically insignificant results. Using simulated biomass data on
the whole sample corroborates our findings, suggesting that our results carry over to
inferring stock status through biomass.
Exploring heterogeneous effects, we find that transferable quotas have a stronger fa-
vorable effect than non-transferable quotas. We further find that PPRs tend to be more
effective for very high levels of ownership protection, a high degree of trade openness, a
high species value, and a high species growth rate. For the latter, we find that the treat-
ment effect materializes soon after implementation, suggesting that high-growing species
respond faster to the policy. As warmer regions, such as Southeast Asia and Central
America have a high share of fast-growing species, our results suggest that a shift from
open-access to PPRs might have a larger impact in these areas compared to colder re-
gions with a large share of low-growing species, such as Europe or North America. This
is, obviously, only one dimension that will matter for the success of PPRs. As ownership
protection and rule of law are institutional characteristics that vary between countries,
we also find that PPRs may be less effective in regions with weaker institutions, such as
Western Africa and Latin America. Thus, we find that many fisheries have either favor-
able ecological conditions or institutional conditions to introduce PPRs, but rarely both
combined.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we first give an overview of the
literature on the relationship between PPRs and ecosystem sustainability (Section 2),
followed by a description of the data (Section 3) and the empirical strategy (Section 4).
We then present the estimated effect of PPRs on the probability of a stock collapsing
(Section 5), supplemented by a subsection where we allow the effect of the policy to vary
along different country and species characteristics (Section 5.3). We further discuss where
the introduction of PPRs may be most effective (Section 6). Lastly, we provide concluding
remarks (Section 7).
2 Property rights and ecosystem sustainability
A prominent way of overcoming the problems pervasive in common pool resources has
been to assign private property rights (PPRs) (Coase, 1960). In fisheries, this is typically
achieved with a system of tradable transferable quotas, which assigns a tradable right to
harvest a certain share of the total allowable catch (TAC) to the quota holder (Grafton,
2000; Hannesson, 2004). Especially in the last decades we have seen a policy shift towards
rights-based management in many regions of the world (Costello et al., 2010). Among
the different types of property rights we find individual quotas (IQ), individual transfer-
able quotas (ITQs), individual vessel quotas (IVQs), territorial user rights (TURFs) and
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fisheries cooperatives.
Implementing a quota system requires a country to have the authority to set and
enforce limits on the total catch, which was largely facilitated by the 200-mile exclusive
economic zone (EEZ).3 However, it is important to note that rights-based management,
like different quota systems, are not primarily tools for conservation and rebuilding stocks,
but to achieve economic efficiency. Obviously, the fate of a fish population depends above
all on the size of the total allowable catch (TAC) and what is controlled by the TAC.
In most real systems that are governed with a TAC and some form of PPRs, there are
still uncontrolled dimensions, such as the age or spatial structure of a stock that prevent
a first-best outcome (Smith, 2012). In addition, quota systems could for instance create
additional market failures, like an increased incentive to discard (Arnason, 2012).
The political economy is another potential channel through which a tradable quota
system may improve the state of the stock, as formalized by Costello and Grainger (2018).
By providing ownership of the resource to users, tradable quotas may create an incentive
to lobby for long-term sustainable use of the resource as this will be reflected in the value
of the quota that a quota owner holds. For similar reasons, tradable quotas may provide
incentives for good stewardship, for example by avoiding destructive ways of fishing or
reporting misconduct of peers (van Putten et al., 2014). Relatedly, assigning individual
property rights may also strengthen quota holders’ incentives to make sure the total
allowable catch (TAC) is enforced. Interestingly, a tradable quota system typically leads
to a concentration of quota which is often perceived to be politically undesirable, but may
actually increase the chances to achieve cooperation among users (Ostrom, 2008). While
it is certainly plausible that individual quotas could induce a sense of ownership, it is also
possible that market mechanisms actually destroy stewardship motives as suggested by
the crowding out theory (Frey and Jegen, 2001). This seems especially likely if the actual
fishers have to lease their quota from ”absentee landlords” (Branch, 2009). Hence, the
question to what extent private property right influence marine ecosystems is essentially
an empirical one.
Analyzing the same type of ecological data as in our study, Costello et al. (2008)
find that each additional year an ITQ system is in place, the probability of a stock
collapse decreases by about 0.4 %. While the paper makes an important first step towards
empirically estimating the effect of tradable quota systems, the identification strategy
leaves doubt about whether the effect can be interpreted as causal or not. In a follow up
paper (Costello et al., 2010) the authors address some of the concerns in the original study,
3The concept of EEZs was endorsed by the UN Law of the Sea Conference in the 1970s. An EEZ
usually stretches 200 nautical miles from the coast, and defines the area where a state has special rights
over the exploration and use of marine resources - as well as other types of resources, like oil and gas.
Many coastal countries around the world, although not all, established such zones in the latter part of
the 1970s (Hannesson, 2004).
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but the problem of omitted variable bias and reverse causality remains largely unresolved.4
Furthermore, although PPRs may work on average, their effectiveness will likely vary
with country and species characteristics. Understanding the degree and nature of such
heterogeneous effects will be important for policymakers in designing and implementing
suitable remedies.
In the following years, several papers have appeared to shed light on the question of
how catch shares affect the fate of a fishery by using a subset of countries considered by
Costello et al. (2008) incorporating not only information on catch, but also on biomass.
While this approach may seem more informative at first glance, such subsamples are
likely to be biased towards rich and developed countries that can afford collecting bi-
ological information. Looking at a combination of case studies, Chu (2009) finds that
the implementation of ITQs sometimes have positive, sometimes negative and sometimes
insignificant effects on biomass. Essington (2010) analyzes how the introduction of ITQs
affect biomass, landings, and other variables of interest for the North American Fisheries
and found that the implementation of ITQs did not effect mean values of those vari-
ables, but tended to decrease the variance, especially concerning landings and exploita-
tion rate.5 To investigate the link between PPRs and ecosystem sustainability further,
data on biomass, catch, and landings coming from the RAM stock assessment database
(Ricard et al., 2012) has been used. Melnychuk et al. (2012) analyze how catch shares
help to achieve specific management targets, such as target biomass levels or TAC, and
find fairly weak evidence. In particular, there was no strong correlation between whether
catch shares had been employed and how biomass developed, though catch shares seemed
to dampen excessive, but infrequent, overexploitation and seemed to reduce variability
in catch around the year. These findings have been corroborated by Essington et al.
(2012), who found no direct link between how the fishery developed after introducing
PPRs compared to how it had been performed before.
It remains puzzling that fisheries using catch shares are less likely to collapse, while
effects on biomass are insignificant. Using the RAM database, Costello and Grainger
(2018) provide a potential answer, as they find that an ITQ system has a positive effect
on overexploited stocks, while it has no effect on healthy stocks. Still, the main problem
remains that there may be reverse causality from health of the stock to policy implemen-
tation. On the one hand, PPRs may be introduced when the fishery is performing well, as
there are substantial rents to be distributed to incumbent fishers, creating broad political
support for such policy. On the other hand, PPRs may be introduced as an emergency
4The main specification is a random-effects logit estimator, with no controls except a linear time trend.
Other concerns are persistence of the dependent variable, as well as the problem of standard errors being
correlated over time and within a geographical area.
5While both studies have the strength of using more direct biological information, due to data limita-
tions the analysis is a simple before and after analysis, looking at mean and variance of biomass before and
after the policy. Chu (2009) looks at the effect for 20 different stocks and Essington (2010) investigates
the effect for 15 stocks in North America, while we consider more than 7000 stocks.
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measure rescuing a fishery that is locked in a situation of low biomasses and low catches.
A crisis may hence create the necessary support for any regulatory changes that attempt
to restore or secure the viability of the system (Libecap, 2009; Hersoug, 2005). Relatedly,
the value of the resource may also influence the creation of PPRs. Kaffine (2009) shows
that this effect is ambiguous; while higher value may increase the economic incentive for
harvesters to strengthen (formal or informal) PPRs, it may also lead to a higher pressure
on the resource, requiring higher exclusionary efforts.6 Overall, the question whether in-
stitutional changes, such as a transition from open access to a PPRs, are more likely to
happen if the resource is in a good shape or in a crisis is so far unsolved (Young, 2010).
3 Data and descriptives
3.1 Data
The data used in the empirical analysis has been compiled from several sources. The
ecological data comes from the Sea Around Us (SAU) global catch database (Pauly and
Zeller, 2015), which contains information on global catch in tonnes and US Dollar (USD)
from 1950-2006.7 The geographical breakdown we use is catch per species in each exclusive
economic zone (EEZ).8 Each unique combination of species-EEZ-year then constitutes an
observation in the dataset. The main variable of interest for the empirical analysis is not
catch itself, but we use catch data to infer the exploitation status of the stock.9 The
exploitation status of a specific species in a specific EEZ in a specific year is assigned
according to the criteria in Table 1, which builds on the methodology in Froese et al.
(2012).10
The calculation of exploitation status hinges on a critical assumption of a positive
correlation between catch and abundance. The assumption that catch to a large degree
reflects biomass, however, might not always be met. First, changes in consumer pref-
erences or management regulation could lead to abrupt changes in catch, implying that
low catches may be a result of other factors than stock abundance (Caddy et al., 1998;
6As an example, he looks at surfing spots along the Californian coast and uses waves at the surf break
as a plausible exogenous proxy for resource quality. Using cross-sectional data, he finds that an increase
in surf quality leads to an increase in the strength of PPRs. In this setting, the impact of PPRs on
resource quality would have been overstated if the reverse causality was not accounted for.
7The SAU catch database contains catch for several aggregated categories (higher taxonomic rank),
like genus, family order and class. We only use catch information that is available at the most detailed
level, i.e., the species level. Catch data includes only the part of the catch that is both landed and
reported.
8Note that we use a different geographical area to define a stock than in Costello et al. (2008). Instead
of EEZs, they define a fishery as a stock comprised within a unique Large Marine Ecosystem (LME). The
different EEZs are illustrated in Figure A.2 in Appendix A.
9In two robustness checks, we also infer exploitation status from (i) a small subsample where biomass
data is available, and (ii) a larger sample with simulated biomass data (see Appendix C).
10See Appendix A for an illustration of the different exploitation statuses.
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Table 1: Criteria used to assign exploitation status in a given year
Exploitation status Criterion 1 Criterion 2
1. Undeveloped year<yearMaxCatch catch<10% of MaxCatch
2. Developing year<yearMaxCatch catch ∈ [10%,50%] of MaxCatch
3. Fully exploited catch>50% of MaxCatch
4. Overfished yearCollapsed>year>yearMaxCatch catch ∈ [10%,50%] of MaxCatch
5. Collapsed year>yearMaxCatch catch<10% of MaxCatch
6. Rebuilding year>yearCollapsed catch ∈ [10%,50%] of MaxCatch
Note. The criteria are the same as in Froese et al. (2012). Note that in the analysis we also use a measure of
exploitation status that is aggregated into three broader categories in the following way: 1=Undeveloped,
Developing or Fully exploited, 2=Overfished or Rebuilding and 3=Collapsed. This means that moving
from 1 to 2 and from 2 to 3 implies a deterioration of the status of the stock.
de Mutsert et al., 2008). Second, many stocks also have naturally large fluctuations,
and as the length of the time series increases, the chance of catch falling below a certain
threshold relative to a historical peak increases (Murawski et al., 2007).
Despite potential caveats of using catch as a proxy for abundance, we argue that it
might be our best option for a global examination. Compiling data to estimate biomass is
expensive, and is therefore usually only done by developed nations for species of commer-
cial importance (Ricard et al., 2012). This implies that the data on biomass represents
a biased subsample of the stocks in a given area. Recent studies have also investigated
the relationship between catch and biomass for a subsample of fisheries where both mea-
sures are available (see e.g., Froese et al., 2012). The authors find that there, indeed,
is a positive correlation between catch and the underlying biomass, and that trends in
catch data are consistent with trends in biomass data for fully assessed stocks.11 As a
complementary analysis, we rerun our regressions with (i) biomass data from the RAM
Legacy Stock Assessment Database (Ricard et al., 2012) for a small subsample of our data
and (ii) biomass data for our full sample, which was derived from catch data following
Martell and Froese (2013).12
From the SAU catch database we also collect the real price per tonne in USD, which
reflects ex-vessel prices based on the landings value. To mitigate potential problems
of endogenous local prices, we average the price for each species across all countries,
giving us a single world price. The information on private property rights in the
form of quota systems in fisheries is collected from the EDF catch share database (EDF,
2013). The database contains information on different types of quota systems from around
the world. Note that we define private property rights (PPR) as any type of quota
system with tradable or non-tradable allowances.13 For the sample used in the main
11See also Pauly et al. (2013) for a discussion on the relationship between catch and abundance.
12The findings are presented in Appendix C.4 and C.5, and point in the same direction as our main
findings in Section 5.
13The different quota systems include IQs, ITQs, IVQs, TURFs and cooperatives. We recognize that
quota systems can differ substantially across countries and across species. As we are not primarily
interested in the specific characteristics of different quota systems, but rather the core characteristics of
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analysis only around 4% of all fisheries (i.e., unique species-EEZ combinations) have
implemented a quota system in the time span analyzed (see Appendix Table A.1). To
capture the regenerative capacity of different species, we collect data on species-specific
growth parameters from FishBase (Froese and Pauly, 2015).
Next, we include data on country characteristics. In contrast to the ecological data
and data on management, these observations are (for natural reasons) only available at
the country level. The variables include GDP per capita (in constant 2005 USD), popu-
lation growth, the degree of openness (measured by export plus import, divided by GDP)
and the political system (autocracy/democracy). In an attempt to proxy the “environ-
mental awareness” of a country, we collect data on the number of ratified multilateral
environmental agreements.14 The idea is that a large number of ratified environmental
agreements reflects a higher awareness for environmental problems. In order to capture
potential impacts of a changing climate and year to year changes in the environment, we
use sea surface temperature (SST) from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration (NOAA).15 Lastly, as we are interested in exploring potential interaction effects
between policy implementation and strength of property rights, we collect data on the
Rule of Law indicator from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators.
For one of the main specifications used in the analysis, we have in total 149 914
observations, covering 175 exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and 7234 unique species-EEZ
combinations over the time span 1961-2006.16 Summary statistics for two selected years
(1975 and 2005) are shown in Table 2, while summary statistics for the whole period,
together with a more detailed description of the different data sources, are found in
Appendix A.
3.2 Who implements private property rights?
In the time period 1950-2005 around 4 % of all fisheries in the sample have implemented a
quota system (PPR).17 Figure 1 shows the roll-out over time of PPRs, with the cumulative
development presented in Figure 1a and the yearly distribution in Figure 1b. From the
graphs, we see that most PPRs are implemented from 1980 and onwards, with large
roll-outs in the early 1980s and around 1990.18
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for different variables, grouped by PPR and
this type of policy instrument, we do not make any attempt to distinguish these systems from each other.
We do, however, examine the difference between tradable and non-tradable systems in Table 6.
14We use environmental agreements in other areas than fisheries and water pollution.
15Specifically, we use the Extended Reconstructed Sea Surface Temperature (ERSST) dataset (version
v3b), which is a global monthly dataset available on 2◦x 2◦ grids (see Smith et al., 2008). We average
the mean temperature over years and EEZs using ArcGIS.
16The sample corresponds to the one labeled Medium in the Results section.
17See Table A.1 in Appendix A for summary statistics on PPRs. Note that we only include PPRs that
were implemented before 2006.
18The geographical distribution of PPRs is shown in Figure A.2 in Appendix A.
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Figure 1: The roll-out of PPRs over time. 1950-2005
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non-PPR fisheries for the years 1975 and 2005. PPR includes all fisheries that at some
point during the time period implement a tradable quota system. As can be seen in
Figure 1 only a few fisheries had introduced quota systems before 1975.
Looking at the ecological data, we see that the differences between the two groups are
significant for the categories overfished and rebuilding, where (future) PPR fisheries have a
higher share of overfished stocks and a lower share of rebuilding stocks. For the variable we
are primarily interested in, collapsed, there is no statistically significant difference between
the two groups. However, as the (future) PPR-fisheries already have a higher share of
overfished stocks, they might be more in danger of experiencing collapses in the future.19
We can also see that the intrinsic growth rate is lower for PPR-fisheries and the share of
highly migratory species is substantially lower. The latter is intuitive as these species move
across different jurisdictions, often requiring a bi- or multilateral agreement to be in place
to implement a quota system. The fact that the species move over a large geographical
area also makes it hard to both monitor and enforce regulations, suggesting that highly
migratory species are more prone to overexploitation. Failing to take into account fixed
effects at the species level in the estimation strategy could potentially overestimate the
effect of PPR, as the share of highly migratory stock are lower for this group.
As for the institutional data, PPR-fisheries tend to be located in countries that are
richer, more democratic, have a lower population growth, are slightly less open and have
stronger protection of property rights. While it is not straightforward how the different
variables affect resource exploitation, the summary statistics highlight the importance
of addressing the self-selection problem, as policy implementation does not seem to be
19We also calculate the leave-out mean collapse rate within an EEZ. This means that for each fishery
we calculate the collapse rate for the EEZ, excluding the specific fishery in question. Each fishery within
an EEZ might therefore have a (slightly) different leave-out mean. By including the (leave-out) collapse
rate within the EEZ as a covariate in the analysis, we control for common shocks to the EEZ, like e.g.,
temperature shocks, and for the fact that a high mean collapse rate could impact the fishery-specific
collapse rate.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for 1975 and 2005, by PPR and non-PPR fisheries
1975 2005
PPR Non-PPR Diff PPR Non-PPR Diff
Fishery-level data
Undeveloped (0/1) 0.19 0.21 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.02∗∗∗
Developing (0/1) 0.23 0.29 -0.06 0.01 0.03 -0.03∗∗∗
Fully exploited (0/1) 0.26 0.24 0.01 0.33 0.32 0.02
Overfished (0/1) 0.23 0.11 0.12∗∗∗ 0.37 0.19 0.18∗∗∗
Collapsed (0/1) 0.07 0.10 -0.03 0.21 0.31 -0.10∗∗∗
Rebuilding (0/1) 0.02 0.04 -0.03∗∗ 0.07 0.12 -0.05∗∗∗
Exploitation status (1,3) 1.39 1.36 0.04 1.86 1.94 -0.07
Transition into collapsed (0/1) 0.01 0.02 -0.02∗ 0.03 0.04 -0.01
PPR (0/1) 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
PPR in a particular year (0/1) 0.10 0.00 0.10∗∗∗ 0.99 0.00 0.99∗∗∗
Species-level data
World price, log 6.96 7.38 -0.43∗∗∗ 7.28 7.64 -0.36∗∗∗
Growth parameter 0.27 0.38 -0.11∗∗∗ 0.25 0.35 -0.09∗∗∗
Highly migratory (0/1) 0.05 0.27 -0.21∗∗∗ 0.10 0.26 -0.16∗∗∗
EEZ-level data
Sea surface temperature, log 1.85 2.89 -1.04∗∗∗ 2.18 2.69 -0.52∗∗∗
(Leave-out) mean collapse within EEZ 0.11 0.10 0.01∗∗∗ 0.30 0.31 -0.01∗∗
Country-level data
GDP per capita, log 9.67 8.43 1.23∗∗∗ 10.19 9.12 1.07∗∗∗
Population growth (%) 1.43 1.68 -0.24∗∗∗ 1.01 1.34 -0.33∗∗∗
Openness, % 49.33 53.63 -4.30∗ 61.85 76.89 -15.04∗∗∗
Rule of law (-2 to 2) 1.56 0.44 1.12∗∗∗ 1.58 0.53 1.05∗∗∗
Polity (-10,10) 7.34 2.47 4.87∗∗∗ 9.75 5.95 3.81∗∗∗
Env.agreements (other), log 2.63 2.50 0.13∗∗∗ 4.04 4.04 -0.00
Note. The table shows the means in 1975 and 2005 for the sample used in the main specification. Exploitation status
(1,3) is grouped in the following way: 1=undeveloped, developing or fully exploited, 2=overfished or rebuilding and
3=collapsed. Standard errors are not clustered when testing the difference in means across the two groups.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
random, but rather correlated with several socio-economic dimensions. An important con-
tribution of our study is hence to control for several time-varying country characteristics
in the empirical analysis.
3.3 The development of ecological variables for PPR and non-
PPR fisheries
Figure 2 depicts the development of ecological outcomes in the years 1950-2006. Figure
2a shows the share of stocks (within the PPR or non-PPR group) that are considered
to be collapsed in a given year.20 From the figure we see that the share of collapsed
20Note that a fishery is assigned to the PPR group if a quota system is implemented at some point
during the time period 1950-2005. This means that the group composition stays the same throughout the
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stocks for the two groups follows a somewhat similar development in the beginning of
the period. From the late 1970s, however, the share of collapsed stocks flattens out for
the PPR-group, while it continues to increase for the non-PPR group. After about 10-15
years of a relatively constant share of collapsed stocks, it again starts to increase for the
PPR-group from around 1990.
Figure 2: Collapsed stocks, by PPR and non-PPR fisheries. 1950-2006
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Note. PPR includes all fisheries that at some point during the time period have implemented a tradable quota
system. Panel (a) shows the share of stocks that are collapsed in a given year. Panel (b) shows the share of stocks
that transition from non-collapsed to collapsed in a given year.
The share of collapsed stocks in Figure 2a will typically be a persistent measure as
the collapse ratio today will, by construction, depend on the collapse ratio in previous
periods. In contrast, Figure 2b presents “new” collapses, i.e., the share of stocks that
transition into collapse in a particular year. As seen in the figure, the share of stocks that
transition into collapse are fluctuating around 2% for both groups until the late 1980s. In
the early 1990s both groups experience an increase in the rate of collapse. After this point,
however, the development seems to diverge, where the PPR-fisheries are experiencing a
slowdown in new collapses.21
Comparing the development in ecological outcomes in Figure 2 with the implemen-
tation of PPRs in Figure 1, we see that the divergence in trends happens either around
the same time or some years after the roll-out of PPRs. Whether this simply reflects a
correlation or in fact a causal relationship is something we investigate in the next sections
of the paper.
period, while the share of fisheries within the PPR-group that have a quota system in place in a specific
year will increase over time.
21Note that “new” collapses do not necessarily raise the share of collapsed stocks in a given year as
this can partly or fully be offset by other stocks moving out of collapse (e.g., to a rebuilding state).
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4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Difference-in-differences estimation
The main goal of the paper is to estimate a causal effect of introducing private property
rights (PPR) on ecological outcomes, and to examine how this effect varies with important
institutional and species characteristics. We start by employing a difference-in-differences
(DiD) strategy, where the treatment group includes fisheries which at some point during
the time span have implemented PPRs, while the control group are all other fisheries.22
This strategy is similar to that of Costello et al. (2008), except that we define a broader
group of quota systems to be in the treatment group, by not only considering individual
transferable quotas (ITQs). Also, we use a different geographical breakdown (EEZs). As
the quota systems are rolled out at different points in time, the pre and post treatment
periods will be different across PPR-fisheries. We control for both fishery-specific time-
invariant effects and year specific effects by employing a fixed effects estimation together
with year dummies. This means that characteristics that do not vary over time at a
fishery level, like geographical conditions and species-specific traits, are controlled for in
the estimation. Unlike Costello et al. (2008) we also include several time-variant country
and EEZ characteristics to mitigate potential (time-variant) omitted variable bias.
The outcome we focus on is the degree of exploitation of a stock - with a main focus
on collapsed stocks. Note that the exploitation status is likely to be highly persistent.
In the analysis, we therefore focus on two different measures of collapse: one (persistent)
measure that indicates if a fishery has the status of collapsed in a given year, and one
(transition) measure that indicates a ”new” collapse, i.e., whether a fishery has changed
status from non-collapsed to collapsed in a given year. The outcome variables correspond
to the ones presented in Figure 2.23
Using a DiD strategy, the fixed effects (FE) specification takes the following form:
Pr(yi,j,t = 1) = β1PPRi,j,t +X
′
j,tγ + ci,j + λt + ui,j,t, (1)
where subscript i indicates species, j indicates EEZ24 and t indicates year. Further, X ′j,t
includes selected time-variant control variables at the country level, ci,j indicates fishery-
22Note that introducing PPRs for one species could also have an effect on other species that are not
comprised by the quota system. Different species interact in an ecosystem, where some are predators
and others are prey, and therefore indirect effects will likely occur. This makes our distinction between
the treatment group and the control group less clear. To some extent, we address this by performing a
placebo test, where we randomly re-assign treatment to non-PPR stocks within (i) treated EEZs, and
(ii) random EEZs; see Appendix C.2.
23As we are primarily interested in estimating the effect of PPRs on the probability of preventing a
stock from collapsing, rather than the probability of a stock being (and having been) collapsed, using
“new” collapses seems closer to what we want to measure.
24Note that an EEZ does not always correspond to a country ; in some cases a country can have several
EEZs. Examples are different islands that constitute separate EEZs, but belong to the same country.
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specific fixed effects, λt indicates year dummies and ui,j,t is the time variant idiosyncratic
error. The treatment variable, PPRi,j,t is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a
quota system has been implemented in a specific year, and 0 otherwise. For the persistent
measure of collapse, the variable takes the value of 1 if a stock has the status collapsed in
a given year, and 0 otherwise. For the transition measure of collapse, the variable takes
the value of 1 if a stock moves into collapse in a given year, and 0 otherwise. To account
for potential serial-correlation and within country correlation, we cluster standard errors
at the country level.
A key assumption underlying the DiD strategy is that in absence of the policy in-
tervention, the treatment group and the control group would have followed a similar
development in the outcome variable. While we cannot directly test the common trend
assumption, similar pre-treatment trends give an indication that the assumption holds.
We can quantitatively verify if the pre-treatment trends are parallel by including leads
and lags dummies relative to the time of treatment. In other words: we interact the
treatment variable (PPRi,j,t) with a dummy variable indicating the time relative to im-
plementation. The lead dummies include the years before implementation, while the lag
dummies include the years after implementation. If we denote M as the number of leads
and K as the number of lags, we can estimate the unfolding of the treatment with the
regression:
Pr(yi,j,t = 1) =
M∑
m=0
β−mPPRi,j,t−m +
K∑
k=1
β+kPPRi,j,t+k +X
′
j,tγ + ci,j + λt + ui,j,t, (2)
where lead m captures potential deviations in the pre-treatment m years before treatment
and lag k captures the effect of PPR k years after the implementation. The estimated
coefficients on the lead dummies (β−m) should show no effect of treatment under the
parallel trends assumption, while the coefficients on the lag dummies (β+k) capture how
the treatment effect unfolds over time.
4.2 Instrumental variable strategy
While the DiD estimation addresses parts of the omitted variable bias by including both
fixed effects and selected time-varying control variables at the country level, it fails to give
consistent estimates if the error term is correlated with time-varying omitted variables.25
It seems likely, however, that there could be some self-selection into the policy driven by
omitted time-variant variables. If we have omitted relevant time-varying control variables
that follow different trends for the two groups, the exogeneity assumption may be vio-
lated. Further, if the status of the ecosystem in previous periods affects the probability of
implementing PPRs, then the estimated effect of the policy could be picking up a reverse
causality. An instrumental variable (IV) approach will mitigate these problems by ex-
25I.e., E[ui,j,t|ci,j , X ′i,j,1, ......., X ′i,j,T ] 6= 0.
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ploiting the correlation between the policy variable (PPR) and an instrumental variable.
An IV strategy could also help to mitigate potential problems related to measurement
error bias.26
Here we propose a novel instrumental variable strategy to deal with the particular en-
dogeneity problem of implementing tradable quota systems in fisheries. The IV strategy
we propose is to look at the implementation of tradable quota systems in other envi-
ronmental domains, like water, forest, land, hunting and pollution. Despite being very
different resources, they share some fundamental CPR characteristics, which means that
governments face somewhat similar problems in managing the resources. We hypothesize
that the implementation of tradable quota systems in different environmental domains
reflects a societal preference for market-based policy instruments, and in particular a
preference towards assigning private property rights.27
In addition to looking at quota systems in other domains within the same country,
we include a spatial lag indicating if neighboring countries have quota systems in other
environmental domains, reflecting the idea that preferences for quota systems might be
correlated within regions. The spatially lagged variable includes the number of permit
systems in other areas than fisheries in the 5 closest countries. To find the 5 closest
countries we use a distance measure from the GeoDist database (see Mayer and Zignago,
2011), which captures the population weighted distance in kilometers between two coun-
tries. This second instrument also gives us more data points compared to only looking at
quota systems within the same country.28 The identifying assumptions needed to validate
our strategy are then the following:
Identifying assumption 1: Having a tradable quota system in other common pool
resources (e.g., water, forest, land, pollution) (Z ′j,t) affects the probability of having a
tradable quota system in fisheries (PPRi,j,t) (first stage).
Identifying assumption 2: Having a quota system in other common pool resources
(e.g., water, forest, land, pollution) (Z ′j,t) does not have a direct effect on the probability
of a fish stock collapsing (yi,j,t) (exclusion restriction).
Identifying assumption 3: The status of the stock (yi,j,t) and the tradable quota
systems in fisheries (PPRi,j,t) do not cause implementation of quota systems in other
26Regression coefficients are biased towards zero when the regressor of interest (here: PPR) is measured
with random errors.
27This line of reasoning is inspired by Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) who deal with the potential
self-selection into environmental agreements by instrumenting ratification of the Kyoto Protocol with
membership in the International Criminal Court. The identifying assumption is that both initiatives
reflect an underlying preference for multilateral policy initiatives.
28A detailed overview of the different data sources used to created the instrumental variable is available
in Appendix Table A.5.
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common pool resources (e.g., water, forest, land, pollution) (Z ′j,t) (i.e., the instrument is
independent of all potential outcomes).
Identifying assumption 4: Having a tradable quota system in other common pool
resources (e.g., water, forest, land, pollution) increases the likelihood of having a tradable
quota system in fisheries (monotonicity, i.e., those affected by the IV are affected in the
same direction).
Note that all identifying assumptions are conditional on the fixed effects (ci,j) and time-
varying control variables (X ′j,t, λt) included in the regressions. Assumption 1 is testable
in the form of the first stage in a 2SLS/IV estimation, where the F-statistics indicates the
significance of this relationship, see Section 5.2.1. The second assumption is not testable,
but relies on plausible reasoning. For instance, having a quota system to manage forest
resources should not have a direct effect on the status of a fish stock in the same country.
Similarly, if a country has a tradable permit system for forest resources this should not
have a direct effect on the status of the fish stock in a neighboring country. This seems
not too unlikely. However, one can think of instances where PPRs in other domains
could have a direct impact on the probability of a stock collapse. For example, if you
implement a private property rights system in forestry, then this could displace harvesters
who then have to seek another form of employment. It may be plausible that they could
enter a fishery, which could affect collapse. While we cannot rule out the possibility of
such an effect, using information on PPRs in forestry in neighboring countries will likely
mitigate such a problem. One can also argue that the potential increased pressure from
displaced harvesters would not be particular to PPR-fisheries, but could also affect non-
PPR fisheries. If this is the case, then this effect would be (partly) differenced out in the
DiD set-up. Also, by including the (leave-out) mean collapse rate within the EEZ as a
covariate, we control for common trends to the EEZ, such as an increased pressure from
displaced harvesters.
Another concern could be that the implementation of different quota systems might
reflect a general increase in environmental awareness or improved management capabili-
ties. The IV strategy relies on the assumption that there is no outside factor that both
affect the instrument and the fishery. We make several attempts to address potential vio-
lations of this assumptions. First, by including GDP per capita as a covariate, we control
for the potential that environmental awareness is higher in richer countries. Second, we
include ratification of international environmental agreements as a (time-varying) proxy
for environmental awareness. Third, if there is a general increase in environmental aware-
ness, then this would presumably affect all stocks within a country. By including the
(leave-out) mean collapse rate within the EEZ as a covariate, we control for such common
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trends to the EEZ.29
The third assumption is also not directly testable. Even though it is not obvious why
having a quota system in fisheries should cause implementation of quota systems in other
areas, there might be a problem of potential learning effects. If the quota system in fish-
eries is implemented first, the success or failure of this policy could affect the probability
of introducing a quota system in other parts of the economy. As the problem is really an
issue of timing, we have lagged both instruments five time periods in order to circumvent
potential feedback effects from the endogenous policy variable to the instrument. Also,
by using information on quota systems in neighboring countries, we hope to dampen the
potential problem of violating assumption 3. Given we believe that assumptions 1-4 hold,
we can estimate a causal relationship using the following 2SLS/IV estimation:
First stage: PPRi,j,t = Z
′
j,t−5β1 +X
′
j,tγ + ci,j + λt + i,j,t (3)
Second stage: Pr(yi,j,t = 1) = +β1P̂PRi,j,t +X
′
j,tγ + ci,j + λt + ui,j,t, (4)
where the vector Z ′j,t contains the instrument(s) excluded from the second stage. Data
on the instruments (PPR in other environmental domains) are collected from a variety
of sources, where the main source is the OECD database on tradable permits (OECD,
2013).30 Summary statistics for the two instruments are reported in Appendix Table
A.2. The group means indicate that tradable quota systems in other domains are more
common where there are also quota systems in fisheries, supporting our hypothesis of a
positive correlation.
Figure 3 depicts the development over time for both the endogenous treatment variable
(labeled “PPR-fisheries” in the figure) and the instrumental variable (labeled “IV (Non-
PPR)” for the control group and “IV (PPR)” for the treatment group). The plot indicates
that for the treatment group the roll-out of PPRs in fisheries to a large degree coincided
with the roll-out of PPRs in other environmental domains. Compared to the control
group, the treatment group is implementing more tradable quota systems, and at a faster
pace. Further, the implementation of PPRs in other areas started somewhat earlier than
the implementation of PPRs in fisheries.31
29We also perform a placebo test, where we randomly re-assign treatment to non-PPR stocks within
treated EEZs. If countries implementing PPRs were indeed better at managing their resources, we would
expect to see a (false) favorable treatment effect in the placebo test - but we don’t (see Section 5.4).
30The OECD database does not contain information about the year of implementation for the different
quota systems. This information has been compiled from multiple sources, see Appendix A.5.
31The geographical implementation of PPRs is depicted in Appendix Figure A.2.
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Figure 3: The roll-out of PPRs over time in fisheries and other environmental domains.
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Note. The long-dashed green line shows the implementation of PPRs in fisheries (i.e., the endogenous treatment
variable). The solid black line and the short-dashed gray line depict the implementation of PPRs in other
environmental domains for the treatment and the control group (i.e., the instrumental variable).
5 Empirical results
5.1 DiD Results
This section reports on the estimated effects of PPRs on fishery collapse. We start by
presenting results from the leads and lags specification of the DiD. Figure 4a plots the DiD
coefficients from equation 2 when no time-varying controls are included, and reveals that
PPR fisheries were experiencing a downward-sloping trend in the probability of collapse
(relative to non-PPR fisheries) prior to policy implementation.32 In other words: the
parallel trend assumption does not seem to hold.
Figure 4b presents estimates when a long list of time-varying covariates are included.33
By controlling for characteristics like GDP per capita, population growth, and the mean
collapse rate within the EEZ, we see that the pre-treatment trend is more similar across
the two groups. While the pre-treatment trend is still significantly different in some years,
the trend is very similar 10 years prior to implementation. We also see that the confidence
intervals are more narrow for all years, meaning that the treatment effect is more precisely
estimated.
After policy implementation, we see that PPR-fisheries are less likely to collapse. The
treatment effect is relatively small in the 10-15 year period after policy implementation,
and only significant for some years. After around 15 years, the effect becomes large and
significant. This suggests that it takes time for the policy to work, and for stocks to
rebuild. After 15 years, a PPR-fishery is 7% less likely to collapse compared to a non-
32This is mainly due to an increase in the collapse rate for non-PPR fisheries, while the collapse rate
for PPR-fisheries is stabilizing.
33See Appendix Table B.1 for a description of covariates included.
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Figure 4: The effect of PPRs on probability of collapse
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(b) Collapse (persistent). Controls (Long)
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(c) Collapse (transition). No controls
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Note. Figures plot the coefficients
∑M
m=0 βˆ−m and
∑K
k=1 βˆ+k estimated from equation 2, where m denotes two year
intervals. The outcome variable in panels (a) and (b) is a binary variable equal to 1 if a stock has the status collapsed, and
0 otherwise. The outcome variable in panels (c) and (d) is a binary variable equal to 1 in the year of a collapse, and zero
otherwise. See Appendix Table B.1 for a description of control sets (Short, Medium, Long). Standard errors are clustered
at the country level.
PPR fishery, conditional on covariates. After 20 years, the probability is 11%, and after
26 years the probability is 21%.34 Panel A in Table 3 reports the average treatment effect
for the post treatment period. Going from no time-varying controls (column 1) to the full
set of controls (column 4) lowers the average treatment estimate from 10.1% to 7.03%.
Taken together, the findings suggest that failing to control for time-varying controls will
lead to a violation of the parallel trends assumption, and an overestimation of the average
treatment effect.
5.1.1 Comparing the magnitude of effects to previous findings
In order to compare the magnitude of effects to previous findings in the literature, we also
estimate annual treatment effects using a linear specification (see Appendix Table B.2).
34See Appendix Table B.3 for coefficients.
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Table 3: The effect of PPRs on probability of collapse
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dep.variable: collapse (persistent)
PPR -0.101∗∗∗ -0.0868∗∗∗ -0.0774∗∗∗ -0.0703∗∗∗
(0.0291) (0.0225) (0.0211) (0.0242)
Panel B. Dep.variable: collapse (transition)
PPR -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0142∗∗∗ -0.0148∗∗∗ -0.0141∗∗∗
(0.00293) (0.00282) (0.00289) (0.00379)
Controls (time-varying) No Short Medium Long
Obs 303160 192725 149914 115648
Period 1950-2006 1961-2006 1961-2006 1961-2006
Countries 169 153 153 95
EEZs 193 175 175 112
EEZ-species 11498 9488 7234 5147
Mean collapse (persistent) 0.141 0.180 0.173 0.173
Mean collapse (transition) 0.0252 0.0304 0.0326 0.0326
Mean years of PPR 12.07 12.33 12.54 12.60
Note. Table reports the coefficient βˆ1 estimated from equation 1. All regressions include
year dummies and EEZ-species fixed effects. See Appendix Table B.1 for a description
of control sets (Short, Medium, Long). Standard errors clustered at the country level in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Using ”Years of PPR” as the treatment variable, which assumes a linear treatment effect
over time, we find that PPRs reduce the probability of collapse by 0.59% per year.35 By
comparison, Costello et al. (2008) find estimates in the range 0.37-0.54% (see Appendix
Figure B.1b). Our estimated treatment effect is hence slightly larger than previously
documented.36 Comparing the unfolding of the treatment effect in Figure 4b to the linear
specification, we also see that the treatment effect materializes more slowly in the first
10-15 years than predicted by a linear relationship (see Appendix Figure B.1a). Allowing
for non-linearities by estimating DiD with leads and lags hence reveals that it takes longer
for the treatment effect to materialize than predicted by a linear model.
35The results are for the specification with the full set of controls. A similar sized effect can also be
found by taking the average treatment effect in column 4 in Table 3 (-0.0703), and dividing it by the mean
years of PPR (12.6), which is reported in the last row in the same table. The linear specification with
no controls shows a treatment effect of 0.82% per year, indicating that failing to control for time-varying
covariates will overstate the treatment effect.
36Note that our study uses a different geographical breakdown (EEZ instead of LME), a longer time
period, and a broader category of PPRs, implying that the results are not directly comparable. Note that
Costello et al. (2008) also estimates the effect of ITQs using a logit fixed effects estimator, and find that
the coefficient is larger than the random effects model. However, it is difficult to interpret the coefficient
from such models as the magnitude is reported in odds-ratio effects.
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5.1.2 Transition into collapse
The results so far show that PPRs lower the probability of collapse. However, Figure 4b
shows that there might still be a problem with different pre-treatment trends. Using a
less persistent outcome variable may help to mitigate this problem. We therefore estimate
the leads and lags specification of the DiD using the transition measure of collapse as
dependent variable. In other words, we estimate the probability of a “new” collapse in
a given year. Figure 4c shows the results when no time-varying controls are included,
and reveal a very similar pre-treatment development for the treatment and control group.
Again, we see that the treatment effect is relatively small up until around 15-20 years
after the policy implementation. Adding time-varying controls has minor effects on the
estimated treatment effect, and seems to widen the confidence intervals somewhat, see
Figure 4d. The latter means that the treatment effects are less precisely estimated, which
may be caused by the smaller sample. The average treatment effects are shown in Panel
B in Table 3. On average, having PPRs reduces the probability of a fishery collapsing in
a given year by 1.4-1.5%. This effect is large and relevant given the average number of
fisheries that transition into collapse each year is 3.26%.
5.2 IV-DID Results
In Section 5.1, we showed that PPRs on average lower the probability of a fishery collaps-
ing. However, for some specifications, we reject the hypothesis of a similar pre-treatment
development in the outcome variable. Further, while we are including time-varying co-
variates, there might be problems of omitted variables affecting the outcome in the post-
treatment period. To further investigate the causal effect of PPRs on the probability of a
fishery collapsing, we report results using the instrumental variable specification described
in Section 4.2.
5.2.1 First stage
Table 4 reports the first stage of the IV/2SLS estimation. The first stage estimates the
effect of having tradable permit systems in other environmental domains on the probability
of having a tradable quota system in fisheries (PPR). Column (1) shows that the coefficient
is positive and significant at a 1 % level. The F-statistics is just below the rule of thumb
of 10 (F-stat=9.48). Including the spatially lagged IV in column (2) gives both a larger
coefficient and a higher F-statistics (F-stat=22.79). The coefficient of 0.0133 tells us that
if a neighboring country has one tradable quota system in an environmental domain other
than fisheries, it increases the probability of a specific fishery having PPRs in a specific
year by 1.33 %, conditional on fishery-specific and year-specific effects. If 5 neighboring
countries have 2 tradable quota systems each in an environmental domain other than
fisheries (i.e., 10 in total), the probability of a fishery having PPRs increases by 13.3 %.
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Table 4: First stage. The effect of PPRs in other environmental domains on PPRs in
fisheries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PPR other areas 0.00673∗∗∗ 0.00377∗∗
(0.00219) (0.00150)
PPR other areas, spatial lag 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗ 0.0150∗∗∗
(0.00256) (0.00207) (0.00192) (0.00201) (0.00256)
Controls (time-varying) No No No Short Medium Long
Obs 233922 233922 233922 157471 149914 115648
Countries 169 169 169 153 153 95
EEZs 193 193 193 175 175 112
EEZ-species 9376 9376 9376 7621 7234 5147
F-stat excl. instr. 9.481 22.79 49.66 51.26 51.03 34.57
Note. Table reports the coefficient βˆ1 estimated from equation 3. Dependent variable, PPR, is a binary variable at
the fishery level indicating if a tradable quota system has been implemented in a specific year. Both instruments are
lagged five time periods. All regressions include species-EEZ fixed effects, as well as year dummies. See Appendix
Table B.1 for an description of control sets (Short, Medium, Long). Standard errors clustered at the country level
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Performing a redundancy test shows that the estimation is improved if the first IV
(PPR other areas) is dropped from the estimation. This leads us to estimate the first
stage with the spatially lagged IV only, see column (3). The F-statistics of 49.66 suggests
that the spatially lagged IV performs better than the IV reflecting other quota systems
within the same country.37 Adding country-level controls (columns 4-6) has minor effects
on the estimated coefficient. Adding more controls reduces the number of observations as
some controls are only available for a subset of the sample. Based on the findings in this
section, we use the spatially lagged IV to estimate the second stage.38
5.2.2 Second stage
Table 5 reports the results from the IV-DiD strategy. Panel A shows the effects of PPRs
when using the persistent measure of collapse. With the exception of column 1, the IV-
DiD coefficients are slightly larger than the DiD coefficients in Table 3. They are also
less precisely estimated: the IV strategy gives significant effects for column 2 and 3 only.
These are also the specifications with the largest F-statistics (50.99 and 50.83), meaning
that the first stage is stronger.39 Using the short list of controls (column 2), PPR-fisheries
37This might be due to the fact that we use more information when constructing the variable, and
more countries get non-zero values. A potential advantage with the spatially lagged instrument is that
it might be less likely to violate identification assumptions 2-3.
38The main results in the paper also carry over to the use of two instruments.
39The F-statistic is indicated by Weak-ID test in Table 5, and is the F-statistic on the excluded
instrument. The F-statistic is the robust Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic. Using the critical values
from Stock and Yogo (2005) to compute the maximum IV bias, we find that the IV bias is maximum
10 %. Using a test statistic robust to weak instruments (Anderson-Rubin), the estimated effect of PPRs
(βˆ1) is still significant at a 5% level in column 2 and 3.
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are on average 14.8% less likely to collapse after policy implementation. Compared to the
DiD estimate of 8.68%, this effect is about 1.71 times larger. Using the medium list of
controls, the probability is 12.9% - about 1.67 times larger than the DiD estimate.
Table 5: Second stage. The effect of PPRs on probability of collapse
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Dep.variable: collapse (persistent)
PPR -0.0810 -0.148∗∗ -0.129∗∗ 0.0760
(0.149) (0.0697) (0.0616) (0.0694)
Panel B: Dep.variable: collapse (transition)
PPR -0.0787∗∗∗ -0.0848∗∗ -0.103∗∗ -0.0998∗
(0.0301) (0.0386) (0.0434) (0.0545)
Controls (time-varying) No Short Medium Long
Obs 233922 157471 149914 115648
Period 1955-2006 1961-2006 1961-2006 1961-2006
Countries 169 153 153 95
EEZs 193 175 175 112
EEZ-species 9376 7621 7234 5147
Mean collapse (persistent) 0.152 0.184 0.173 0.173
Mean collapse (transition) 0.0284 0.0325 0.0326 0.0326
Weak-ID test 48.55 50.99 50.83 33.57
Anderson-Rubin p-value (persistent) 0.585 0.0237 0.0265 0.254
Anderson-Rubin p-value (transition) 0.00827 0.0132 0.00653 0.0604
Anderson-Rubin CI (persistent) [-.381, .208] [-.299,-.024] [-.263,-.015] [-.052, .232]
Anderson-Rubin CI (transition) [-.142,-.023] [-.175,-.019] [-.204,-.029] [-.218, .001]
Note. Table reports the coefficient βˆ1 estimated from equation 4. All regressions include species-EEZ fixed
effects, as well as year dummies. See Appendix Table B.1 for a description of control sets (Short, Medium, Long).
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Weak-ID test indicates the robust Kleibergen-
Paap Wald rk F statistic. The Anderson-Rubin test is a weak-instrument robust test of the significance of βˆ1.
Anderson-Rubin CI shows the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Panel B in Table 5 reports the IV estimates when using the transition measure of
collapse as the outcome. All specifications show a negative and statistically significant
effect of PPRs on the probability of collapse.40 Compared to the DiD estimates in Table
3, the effects are stronger (i.e., more negative coefficients). When no controls are included,
the estimated treatment effect is over 4 times larger than the DiD estimates. Adding more
controls increases the IV-DID estimate slightly, while leading to less precisely estimated
coefficients.
The stronger effects could have several potential explanations. First, one possible
explanation is that PPR-fisheries have experienced less favorable trends in relevant omit-
ted variables, like a more rapid technological development relative to non-PPR fisheries,
which might have put a larger pressure on these fish stocks. If this trend is not captured
by the time-varying controls, the DiD estimate might be biased downwards. Second, if
40This is also the case when using a weak-instrument robust test (Anderson-Rubin).
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the exclusion restriction does not hold (i.e., the instrumental variable has a direct effect
on the outcome variable), the IV estimate could be inflated. Third, measurement error in
the treatment variable could bias the DiD coefficient downwards. An IV-strategy would
mitigate such attenuation bias. Fourth, the IV estimate reflects a local average treatment
effect; it captures the effect on a subpopulation that is induced by the instrument to
change the value of the endogenous regressor PPR. The estimate is hence not an average
for all treated units, but for an instrument specific subpopulation (the ”compliers”).41
While we cannot pinpoint the reason for the larger IV estimates, we can still conclude
that both the DiD and the IV-DID estimate show a favorable effect of PPRs on the
probability of a fishery collapsing. Our results also suggest that the treatment effects are
at least as large, or larger, than found in the previous literature.42
5.3 Heterogeneous effects
Having found that PPRs lead to more favorable outcomes on average, we now turn to
potential heterogeneous effects. Specifically, we investigate whether the favorable effects
of PPRs vary with (i) the transferability of quotas, (ii) the overall level of PPR protection
in a country, (iii) trade openness, (iv) species growth rate, and (v) species value. These
are characteristics highlighted by Chichilnisky (1994), Brander and Taylor (1997), Bohn
and Deacon (2000), Copeland and Taylor (2009), and Kaffine (2009).
When analyzing transferability, we split the sample in two based on whether the quotas
are registered as transferable or non-transferable by the EDF catch share database (EDF,
2013). For country and species characteristics, we split the sample in two based on high
or low values. To investigate the pre-treatment trend, and to see how the treatment effect
unfolds over time, we use the DiD with leads and lags when estimating heterogeneous
effects.43
5.3.1 Transferable vs. non-transferable
Are transferable quotas more effective in preventing a collapse than non-transferable ones?
While allowing quota holders to trade will in theory lead to cost minimization, the effect
on ecological outcomes are less clear.44 Here we run separate regressions for the two
41See Section 5.3 for a further discussion on this, as well as how the IV estimate can be interpreted.
42To examine a broader range of outcomes, we also use each of the different exploitation statuses as
outcomes. These results are presented in Appendix C.3. In short, we find that PPRs have a significant
and favorable effect on two categorical variables of exploitation status (Exploitation (1-3) and Exploitation
(1-6)). Further, we find that PPRs increase the probability of a fishery being undeveloped, developing
and overexploited, but none of these effects are statistically significant. The effects of PPRs on recovering
and fully exploited stocks is close to zero and insignificant.
43In Appendix B.4, we allow for treatment effects to vary in a linear and non-linear way with the
different country and species characteristics. Results are in line with the findings presented in the main
text.
44As discussed earlier, transferability will typically lead to a concentration of quotas, which may increase
the chances to achieve cooperation among users (Ostrom, 2008). At the same time, introducing market
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groups of quotas to capture potential heterogeneous performance. Distinguishing between
transferable and non-transferable quota systems, we find that transferable quotas show
a somewhat stronger treatment effect, see Figure 5 and Table 6. Using the persistent
measure of collapse, the effect of PPRs is estimated to be between -7.4% and -9.4% -
depending on the specification. By contrast, the estimates for non-transferable quotas
are between -4.3% and -6.2% and only significant in two of the specifications.45
Figure 5: The effect of PPRs on probability of collapse. Transferable vs. non-
transferable
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Note. Figures plot the coefficients
∑M
m=0 βˆ−m and
∑K
k=1 βˆ+k estimated from equation 2, where m denotes two year
intervals. Outcome variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a stock has the status collapsed, and 0 otherwise. Controls:
Long. See Appendix Table B.1 for a description of control sets (Short, Medium, Long).
While these findings suggest that going from non-transferable to transferable quotas
might improve ecological outcomes, it is important to point out that transferability is not
necessarily randomly assigned, but might correlate with country characteristics. While
our estimation strategy and covariates help to control for some factors, we must be careful
in interpreting the difference as causal evidence that tradable quotas are more effective.
To get closer to a causal effect, we restrict the treatment group to the only country that
has both tradable and non-tradable quotas in place: Chile.46 This allows us to compare
two types of quotas within the same country. A drawback is that we are left with very few
treated stocks, which weakens the generalizability of results. Restricting the treatment
group to Chilean stocks only, we estimate the effect of tradable quotas to be -11%, while
the effect of non-tradable quotas is -6.6% (see Appendix Table B.4).
mechanisms could also crowd out intrinsic motivation for stewardship (Frey and Jegen, 2001).
45Using the transition measure of collapse, we only find significant effects for the transferable quotas.
While the estimated effects are systematically more favorable for tradable quotas compared to non-
tradable quotas, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of similar average treatment effects. The only
significant difference is the one between column (1) and (4) in Panel A in Table 6, although only at a
10% level.
46Chile has 12 fisheries managed by transferable quotas and 13 fisheries managed by non-transferable
quotas, according to the EDF catch share database (EDF, 2013).
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Table 6: The effect of PPRs on probability of collapse. Transferable vs. non-transferable
Transferable Non-transferable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Dep.variable: collapse (persistent)
PPR -0.0941∗∗∗ -0.0803∗∗∗ -0.0741∗∗∗ -0.0428∗∗ -0.0619∗∗∗ -0.0449
(0.0257) (0.0237) (0.0265) (0.0185) (0.0220) (0.0290)
Panel B. Dep.variable: collapse (transition)
PPR -0.0149∗∗∗ -0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0157∗∗∗ -0.0101 -0.00175 -0.00299
(0.00311) (0.00351) (0.00447) (0.0153) (0.0135) (0.0171)
Controls (time-varying) Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
Obs 191378 148663 114479 186735 144402 110173
Period 1961-2006 1961-2006 1961-2006 1961-2006 1961-2006 1961-2006
Countries 153 153 95 153 153 95
EEZs 175 175 112 175 175 112
EEZ-species 9450 7198 5113 9308 7056 4970
Note. Table reports the coefficient βˆ1 estimated from equation 1. All regressions include year dummies and EEZ-
species fixed effects. See Appendix Table B.1 for a description of control sets (Short, Medium, Long). Standard
errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In addition to these findings, one can also argue that the IV strategy employed in
Section 5.2.2 captures the effect of tradable quota systems on collapse. The reasoning
would be that the ”compliers”, i.e., those that are ”moved” by the instrument, will be
countries with a general preference for market-based instruments such as tradable quo-
tas. The smaller (i.e., more favorable) IV-DiD estimate could therefore be interpreted as
tradable quotas performing better than non-tradable ones.
Based on the three findings described above, we cautiously suggest that transferability
of quotas improve the favorable effect of PPRs on ecological outcomes.
5.3.2 PPR strength
The next characteristic we investigate is the strength of PPR protection. If fishermen
perceive PPRs as uncertain, they might become more impatient and pay less attention
to the long-term sustainability of the fishery. This suggests that the effect of tradable
quotas will increase with ownership security. On the contrary, weak PPRs could also
deter investment in the sector, dampening the pressure on the stock (Bohn and Deacon,
2000).
To proxy the strength of PPRs, we use the Rule of Law indicator from the World
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators.47 The first row in Figure 6 shows a histogram
47As the data is only available for the last part of the time period analyzed, we use the country average.
An alternative approach could be to drop all years lacking observations, or to extrapolate the data back
in time. As the indicator varies little over time, we argue that not much is lost by averaging the data;
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of the rule of law, as well as results for two subsamples with different levels of ownership
protection. From 6a, we see that the rule of law is generally very high for PPR fisheries.
This means that we are only able to evaluate how the effects of PPRs vary with high
to very high levels of ownership protection. In Figure 6b we have restricted the sample
to observations with ownership protection below the 90th percentile, while Figure 6c
only uses observations with ownership protection in the top 90th percentile. The DiD
estimation suggests that PPRs are more effective for very high levels of PPR protection.
Hence, our results do not support the hypothesis put forward by Bohn and Deacon (2000)
that ownership security may increase pressure on the stock.
5.3.3 Trade openness
Chichilnisky (1994) argues that trade openness decreases overexploitation in countries
with strong PPRs by shifting the overuse to regions with weaker regulation. Brander and
Taylor (1997), however, demonstrate that openness can also work in the opposite direc-
tion: if resource-scarce countries with ill-defined PPRs overexploit their natural resources,
opening up for trade will dampen overexploitation. Put differently: countries with well
defined PPRs might increase their resource exploitation (vis-a-vis countries with poorly
defined PPRs) as a response to openness. Erhardt (2018) tests this question empirically
and finds that trade openness reduces pressure on fish stocks in countries with weak
governance, in line with what Brander and Taylor (1997) suggested.
To capture the degree of trade openness, we use export and imports as a share of
GDP. From Figure 6d, we see that trade openness ranges from about 0% to 300%. In
Figure 6e we restrict the sample to observations with openness below the mean, while
Figure 6f shows the results for values of openness above the mean. The estimation shows
that PPRs are more effective in countries with a high degree of trade openness. This
suggests that open economies have more to gain from implementing PPRs compared to
less open economies.48 The result lends support to Chichilnisky (1994) who hypothesized
that trade may dampen exploitation in countries with strong PPRs, and also consistent
with the idea that open economies may suffer particularly from lack of clear property
rights (Taylor, 2011).
5.3.4 Growth rate of species
A high regenerative capacity of the resource could potentially strengthen the effectiveness
of PPRs (Copeland and Taylor, 2009). In an attempt to capture the intrinsic growth
rate of different species, we use a growth parameter from Froese and Pauly (2015). From
Figure 6g, we see that there is substantial variation in the growth rate across species, and
most of the variation comes from variation across countries.
48Put differently, the finding also suggests that lack of property rights is more detrimental to countries
with a high degree of trade exposure compared to less exposed countries.
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Figure 6: The effect of PPRs on probability of collapse, by country and species charac-
teristics
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(g) Species growth rate
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Note. Figures (a), (d), (g), and (j) show histograms of rule of law, trade openness, species growth rate, and species price
by treatment and control group. Hollow bars indicate non-PPR fisheries, while red bars indicate PPR fisheries. The other
figures plot the coefficients
∑M
m=0 βˆ−m and
∑K
k=1 βˆ+k estimated from equation 2, where m denotes two year intervals.
Outcome variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a stock has the status collapsed, and 0 otherwise. Controls: Long. See
Appendix Table B.1 for a description of control sets (Short, Medium, Long).
there is also a large degree of overlap between the treatment and control group. Figure
6h and Figure 6i plot the DiD estimate for observations with growth rates below or above
the mean. The results suggest that PPRs are more effective when applied to species with
28
a high intrinsic growth rate. We also see that the treatment effect is materializing earlier
on for high growth species compared to low growth species, indicating that the former
group ”recovers” more quickly. These findings are in line with the theoretical predictions
from Copeland and Taylor (2009).
5.3.5 Species value
Are PPRs more effective for high value species? On the one hand, higher quality (i.e.,
price) might require more monitoring and enforcement efforts due to a larger pressure
on the resource (Kaffine, 2009), which might in turn lower the effectiveness of PPRs.
On the other hand, PPRs might also be more effective for high value species due to
harvesters’ stronger economic incentive to protect their property rights. Figure 6j shows
a histogram of species prices49 for the treatment and control group. Figures 6k-6l plot the
DiD estimate for two subsamples: observations where the species value is either above
or below the mean. Results suggest that PPRs are more effective in preventing collapse
for stocks with a high value. Or put differently, the absence of PPRs is more detrimental
for high-value stocks. As with the results for species growth rate, the effect of PPRs
materialize earlier for high-value stocks than low-value stocks, and the magnitude is also
larger.
5.4 Robustness checks
In this section, we run several robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our main result.
A summary of the findings are provided below, while figures, tables and more detailed
descriptions are provided in Appendix C.
5.4.1 Alternative samples
Only treated species. Species managed by quota systems might be systematically
different from those that are not.50 To see to what extent this is influencing results, we
restrict the sample to species that are covered by a quota system in at least one country.
This reduces the number of EEZ-species combination to about 1/4 of that in the main
sample. Figure C.1 and Table C.2 in the Appendix show that results are very similar to
the ones reported in Section 5.1.
Only treated EEZs. Countries implementing PPRs might be better equipped to man-
age their stocks. Specifically, if we believe that treated EEZs were experiencing a stronger
improvement in management capabilities compared to non-treated EEZ, this might up-
ward bias the effect of PPRs. In the main analysis we have tried to control for different
49Prices are global prices averaged over the time period analyzed.
50As an example, migratory species are less likely to be managed by a quota system.
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trends in ”good management” at the country level by including several time-varying
country characteristic, such as GDP per capita, population growth, political orientation,
trade openness and the number of ratified international environmental protocols. Here
we restrict the sample to treated EEZs only, which means that we compare treated to
non-treated fisheries within the same EEZ. Treated and untreated stocks are hence sub-
ject to the same country-specific management capabilities. Limiting the sample to the 12
treated EEZs has very little effect on the main result, see Section C.1 in the Appendix.
5.4.2 Placebo treatment
Another way to try to test for ”good management” as an omitted variable, is to conduct
placebo tests. Specifically, if we think the trend in management capabilities were more
favorable for treated EEZs, we might expect non-PPR fisheries within these EEZs to
perform better as well. To test for this, we re-assign treatment status to a random fishery,
which was actually not treated, but within the same EEZ.51 Next, we drop all fisheries
within the EEZ that were actually treated. Lastly, we redo the DiD analysis from Section
5.1. Looping over this procedure 20 times gives us a distribution of placebo treatments.
If we think there were certain characteristics of the EEZs or countries that made the
PPR-fisheries perform better, we would expect to find a favorable treatment effect in
the placebo tests.52 However, results from the placebo runs show either insignificant
effects or a slightly increased probability of collapse (see Figure C.2a). Based on these
results, countries implementing PPRs do not seem to be better at managing their stocks
in general.53 If we reassign treatment to a fishery within any EEZ, then none of the 20
placebo runs show a negative and significant effect - with the exception of one placebo
test, which shows a positive (i.e., unfavorable) and significant effect (see Figure C.2b).
5.4.3 Collapse measure
Lastly, we address the assumption of a positive correlation between catch and biomass in
two ways. First, we exploit a different dataset containing information on both catch and
biomass - the RAM Legacy Stock Assessment Database (RAM) (Ricard et al., 2012), see
Appendix C.4. As the RAM dataset only includes around 2% of the observations from
our main dataset, and that this is likely a non-random sample, we cannot directly test our
51See Appendix Table A.3 for an overview of the number of treated and untreated stocks within each
EEZ. For New Zealand there are 51 treated and 35 untreated stocks. This means that in the placebo
runs we assign treatment to all 35 non-treated stocks.
52Note, however, that this strategy will only control for potentially different trends in management
capabilities at the EEZ level and not at the fishery (EEZ-species) level.
53In fact, the findings suggest that non-PPR fisheries located in EEZs where stocks are being managed
by quota systems might actually experience an increased pressure. This could be due to fishing efforts
shifting from PPR-stocks to non-PPR stocks. Note, however, that the main results from Section 5.1 are
robust to excluding non-treated stocks within treated EEZs, which suggests that such spillover effects are
likely small.
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main finding of a negative effect of PPRs on the probability of a stock collapsing. Instead,
we investigate how sensitive the effect of PPRs is to using catch instead of biomass when
constructing the exploitation status. In order to do this we create two different dependent
variables using data from the RAM database: one where we assign the exploitation status
“collapsed” based on biomass and one where we assign the status based on catch. For the
small sample, biomass and catch track each other relatively closely (see Appendix Figure
C.4). Using the two measures to estimate the effects of PPRs, we find a favorable effect
using both collapse measures. The effect, however, is not significantly different from zero,
which may be due to the small sample (see Appendix Figure C.5).
Second, we use catch data to infer parameters of carrying capacity K and intrinsic
growth rate r of a biological model that can be used to simulate biomass trajectories of
fisheries for which assessed biomass data is not available following Martell and Froese
(2013); see Appendix C.5 for details.54 We then use the generated biomass data to assign
exploitation status based on biomass, as well as catches. Analyzing the leads and lags
specification of the DiD reveals that the results from constructed biomass are very similar
to the results obtained using catch data with the full sample (compare Appendix Figure
C.6 with Figure 4). Using constructed biomass data shows a slightly larger treatment
effect, i.e., 14.2% with no controls and 11.7% with full controls. Overall, these findings
suggest that our results in the main text using catch data also hold when inferring stock
status from (synthetic) biomass data.
6 Discussion
Our main analysis has focused on recovering unbiased parameters of the effect of PPRs
on collapse, and exploring how these treatment effects vary with different country and
species characteristics. Here, we draw on these estimated relationships to predict and
discuss the potential effectiveness of PPRs if implemented in non-PPR fisheries around
the world.55
Before doing so, it is important to remind the reader that the main goal of this paper
has not been to make out-of-sample predictions. We therefore need to exert caution
in applying the estimated relationship between PPRs and various country and species
characteristics to non-PPR fisheries. This is particularly the case for ownership protection,
54Essentially, the method provides estimates for r and K even if the fishery is data-poor and traditional
estimation techniques (e.g., linear regression) are not feasible. Obviously, there are important caveats
to consider. First, there is substantial room for error, because the estimations often rely on few obser-
vations. Second, to simulate biomass trajectories, one needs to assume priors, which are based on little
information. Third, catch is still the only explanatory variable, which allows us to use it on the entire
sample. Alternatively, one could consider using also broader information (e.g., life-history traits) on a
smaller sample to assess the state of the stock (Costello et al., 2012).
55See also Diekert et al. (2010) for a discussion on the potential effectiveness of PPRs for different
regions around the world.
31
where there is little overlap between the two groups, and making predictions will involve
large extrapolations. For species characteristics, there is a larger degree of overlap, and
predictions might be less problematic. In the following, we explain the steps taken to make
predictions for non-PPR stocks, including procedures to alleviate problems of excessive
extrapolation.
6.1 Predicted effectiveness of PPRs for non-treated stocks
Where would PPRs be most effective if implemented in (currently) non-PPR fisheries?
To shed light on this question, we use the estimated heterogeneous effects of PPRs to
make out-of-sample predictions. Concretely, we use the estimated relationship between
PPRs and country and species characteristics derived from 2-5th degree polynomials (see
Appendix Figure B.2), and apply these to stocks not covered by PPRs.56
We start by making four separate predictions based on (i) species growth rate, (ii)
species value, (iii) rule of law, and (iv) trade openness. To mitigate problems of extreme
values and excessive extrapolations, we bound the values of the species and country char-
acteristics by the intervals shown in the respective sub-figures in Appendix Figure B.2.57
As the rule of law variable exhibits little in-sample variation, we introduce an additional
variable to proxy for ownership protection: (constant) GDP per capita. While this vari-
able correlates with ownership protection, there is at the same time more overlap between
the treatment and control group, which might make it more suitable for making pre-
dictions.58 Averaged predicted effects by EEZs for each of these five characteristics are
presented in Appendix Figure D.1. To arrive at a single predicted effect for each EEZ, we
calculate an unweighted average of the five characteristics, which is presented in Figure
7c. Lastly, we also show predictions based on species characteristics only (Figure 7a), or
country characteristics only (Figure 7b).59
Making predictions based on species characteristics only, we see that warmer regions
close to the equator show a larger potential effect of PPRs relative to colder regions. This
is both due to high species growth rates in these regions (see Appendix Figure D.1a)
and high species prices (see Appendix Figure D.1b). Regions such as Southeast Asia,
Oceania (with the exception of New Zealand), the Caribbean and parts of Africa show
a particularly high potential. Colder regions, such as Northern Europe, North America,
New Zealand, but also South America and South Africa, show a smaller predicted effect
of PPRs. Globally, the EEZs in the top quartile show a predicted effect of 8.9-9.8%, while
56Due to the lack of overlap between the treatment and control group for rule of law, we only use two
categories: very high rule of law, and low to high rule of law, which correspond to the groups used in
Figure 6b and 6c.
57Specifically, we replace the value of the species or country characteristic by the minimum or maximum
of the bounded interval. For example, a species value larger than USD 5000/ton is replaced by 5000 before
using the values to make predictions.
58Estimation results for GDP per capita are presented in Appendix B.5.
59These results are also presented as scatter plots in Appendix Figure D.2.
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Figure 7: Predicted effect of PPRs for non-treated stocks
(a) Species characteristics (b) Country characteristics
(c) Species and country characteristics
Note. Maps show the predicted effect of PPRs based on species and/or country characteristics of non-PPR stocks. Map
(a) shows the average of predictions based on species growth rate and species price. The species growth rate is restricted to
be in the interval [0.05, 0.5]. Species prices are restricted to be in the interval (0, 5000]. Values below (above) the bounded
interval are assigned the minimum (maximum) value in the given interval. Map (b) shows the average of predictions based
on trade openness, rule of law, and GDP per capita. Trade openness is restricted to be in the interval [30,90]. GDP per
capita is restricted to be in the interval [20,34]. Rule of law is divided into two groups based on a value below or above the
90th percentile. Map (c) shows average predictions based on species characteristics (growth rate and price) and country
characteristics (trade openness, rule of law, and GDP per capita). See Appendix D for more details.
the bottom quartile show a predicted effect of 5.6-7.6%. Compared to the estimated
treatment effect of actually treated stocks (7%), the majority of non-PPR stocks show a
more favorable effect of PPRs on collapse, i.e., a higher effectiveness.60
Using country characteristics to predict the effect of PPRs, the picture is to a large
degree reversed (see Figure 7b). Regions with strong ownership protection, high GDP
per capita, and high trade openness are predicted to benefit relatively more from PPRs.
As a consequence, regions such as Northern Europe show larger predicted effects.61 The
relatively high effectiveness for various small island, e.g., in the Caribbean and Pacific, is to
a large degree caused by these EEZs being under British, American or French territory.
They are hence assigned country characteristics based on the sovereign country. The
relatively large predicted effect for some African EEZs are primarily driven by a high
60This may be more clearly illustrated by looking at Appendix Figure D.2, where most non-treated
EEZs lie above the horizontal line indicating the estimated average effect for treated stocks.
61This is also very clearly seen from Appendix Figure D.2, where most of the EEZs located to the far
right on the x-axis are in Western and Northern Europe.
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trade openness rather than rule of law and GDP. Regions with relatively low potential
based on country characteristics include Latin America, parts of the Mediterranean, India,
Pakistan, China, Japan and Indonesia. Globally, the EEZs in the top quartile show a
predicted effect of 7.3-11%, while the bottom quartile show a predicted effect of 3.4-4.5%.
Compared to the estimated treatment effect of actually treated stocks (7%), the majority
of non-PPR stocks hence show a smaller potential effect of PPRs in preventing collapse.
Taking both species and country characteristics into account (see Figure 7c), Northern
Europe, parts of Central America, as well as islands in Southeast Asia and the Pacific show
the largest potential. However, these islands also have a high share of highly migratory
species (see Appendix Figure D.2), which are likely harder to manage by PPRs as they
require multilateral cooperation. Regions with relatively low potential include South
America, Mexico, Russia, Mediterranean, and South Africa. Overall, the EEZs in the top
quartile show a predicted effect of 7.7-9.9%, while the bottom quartile show a predicted
effect of 4.6-6.1%. Compared to the estimated treatment effect of actually treated stocks
(7%), a little over half of non-PPR stocks show a smaller potential for PPRs lowering the
collapse probability.
To summarize, species characteristics of non-PPR stocks indicate a potentially large
effect of PPRs, while country characteristics pull in the opposite direction. If we give
the five characteristics equal weight, about half of the non-treated stocks have predicted
effects of PPRs that are at least as favorable as for actually treated stocks.
7 Conclusion
The misguided incentive for individuals to overexploit common pool resources (CPR) is
a well-known phenomenon, giving rise to the tragedy of the commons, where the resource
and potential rents are depleted (Hardin, 1968; Stavins, 2011). Manifestations of the
tragedy are found in natural resources like forests, rivers, and pasture lands, as well
as the global atmosphere in terms of accumulation of greenhouse gases. Of all renewable
resources, ocean fisheries are probably the most depressing example of the ill consequences
of a common pool resource that is left to open access (Heal, 2007). A potential solution
is the establishment of private property rights (PPRs), which has compelling theoretical
arguments (Wilen, 2000), but the empirical evidence of whether establishing PPRs does
improve sustainability is mixed (van Putten et al., 2014). In this paper, we have tried
to quantify a causal relationship from PPRs to fisheries collapse, as well as highlight
important institutional and species characteristics that either strengthen or weaken the
effect.
Our main finding is that private property rights, in the form of quota systems, lower
the probability of a stock collapsing. Using a DiD set-up, we find that the average
probability of a PPR-fishery collapsing after policy implementation decreases by 7-10%
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- depending on specification and sample size. Further, we find that the probability of
a PPR-fishery moving into collapse in a given year decreases by 1.4-1.8%. Applying
an IV-DID strategy leads to somewhat larger effects - in particular for the transition
measure of collapse. Investigating heterogeneous effects, we find that trade openness,
a high species growth rate, and species price tend to strengthen the favorable effect of
PPRs. Typically, these factors increase the potential rents that can be extracted from
the fish stock, which can be good or bad, depending on the institutional setting. Under
open access, higher potential rents may increase the incentive to overexploit the resource,
potentially making a stock collapse more likely. At the same time, higher rents may also
lead to more effective regulations, in line with our findings.62 Further, we find that strong
ownership protection and transferability of quotas make PPRs more effective. This lends
support to the idea that ownership increases the incentives for quota holders to lobby for
quotas that are maximizing the net present value of the quota (Arnason, 2012; Costello
and Grainger, 2018), though we cannot test this particular mechanism with our data.
Carefully designed economic experiments or case studies may shed further light on the
importance of different mechanisms explaining why transferable quota may lead to better
outcomes.
The effectiveness of PPRs depends on species characteristics, as well as institutional,
i.e., country characteristics. As PPRs are mainly implemented in countries with strong
formal institutions, we might not see the same favorable effect in countries with weaker
institutions. Our exploratory analysis points to an important tension. Many fisheries
have either favorable species characteristics or favorable country characteristics, but rarely
both. While species characteristics of non-treated stocks point in the direction that PPRs
will have relatively large effects, country characteristics pull in the opposite direction.
Therefore, the question whether PPRs are a suitable management tool in specific fisheries
needs to carefully consider the ecological and institutional conditions at hand.
While we have found that PPRs reduce the chances of a stock collapse, we have
only made first steps to disentangle the potential feedbacks between different country
characteristics, institutions, and ecosystem state. In order to give credible guidance to
policy makers, future research should strive to identify a causal effect of implemented
policy, taking into account that policy may interact with institutions already in place,
either formal or informal. Further, as natural resources and social-ecological systems are
facing increasing pressure, both through high exploitation levels, but also as a result of
climate change, a better understanding of the evolution of institutions, and in particular
how institutions respond to changes in the environment, will be an important and growing
research field in the future.
62See Copeland and Taylor (2009) for a theoretical model.
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